Delta Independent Science Board -- Comments on the Sacramento / Delta Draft Staff Report

Delta Stewardship Council (Delta Council) | January 19th, 2024

Department of the Interior Nature-Based Solutions Roadmap

Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability (Duke University) | December 1st, 2023

Developing the Next Framework to Manage the Colorado River: Flexible Tools to Benefit Tribes and the Basin

Water and Tribes Initiative | August 2nd, 2022

Development and Application of a 1D Compaction Model to Understand 65 Years of Subsidence in the San Joaquin Valley

American Geophysical Union (AGU) | June 2nd, 2022

High rates of land subsidence, caused by groundwater overdraft, are resulting in millions of dollars of infrastructure damage in California's San Joaquin Valley (SJV). In

High rates of land subsidence, caused by groundwater overdraft, are resulting in millions of dollars of infrastructure damage in California's San Joaquin Valley (SJV). In recent years, the use of interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR) has enabled us to substantially improve our understanding of this subsidence. However, only very occasionally have the InSAR data been integrated with a physical model of subsurface compaction. Here, we have used InSAR and other data to parameterize and calibrate a 1D compaction model. We applied our model to a study area in the SJV where we had access to the necessary information on hydraulic head to develop model inputs. Our model simulated subsidence in the three aquifer system layers over the period 1952–2017, and is the first 1D compaction model in the SJV to simulate multiple aquifer system layers from the 1950s to 2017. The results from our model suggest that previous studies have significantly underestimated the time constants governing the slow, residual compaction of subsurface clays. We suggest that residual compaction of clays is a process that continues for decades-to-centuries, indicating that to significantly reduce subsidence requires some recovery of head, not just a stabilization. We also show how compaction in the lower, confined aquifer has accounted for over 90% of subsidence in the past 20 years. Although our study area is small, our findings are likely representative of the subsiding regions of the SJV, and our methodology can be applied to unconsolidated aquifer systems exhibiting subsidence worldwide.

Dimension reduction approach for understanding resource-flow resilience to climate change

Nature Portfolio (Springer Nature) | June 15th, 2024

Draft EIR Monterey Amendment to the State Water Project Contracts (Including Kern Water Bank Transfer) and Associated Actions as Part of a Settlement Agreement (Monterey Plus)

California Department of Water Resources (DWR) | April 1st, 2015

The California Department of Water Resources (Department), as the lead agency under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), prepared the environmental impact rep

The California Department of Water Resources (Department), as the lead agency under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), prepared the environmental impact report (EIR) for the Monterey Amendment to the State Water Project Contracts (Including Kern Water Bank Transfer) and Associated Actions as Part of a Settlement Agreement (Monterey Plus) (Monterey Plus EIR). The Department certified the Monterey Plus EIR on February 1, 2010. Several parties challenged the adequacy of the Monterey Plus EIR under CEQA. In 2014, the Monterey Plus EIR was found by the Sacramento County Superior Court (Court) to comply with CEQA in all aspects except with respect to the development, use, and operation of the Kern Water Bank (KWB). The Court specified that the Department is to correct the deficiencies and recertify the EIR without reopening the non-defective portions of the EIR. Upon recertification, only those portions of the Revised EIR (REIR) that are new or changed shall be subject to challenge under CEQA by petitioners or other interested parties. For these reasons, the Department has developed this three-volume Monterey Plus Draft Revised EIR. Document A1 presents all the changes to the Monterey Plus EIR made as a result of the Department’s reanalysis of the Kern Fan Element (KFE) property transfer and new analysis of the KWB development and continued use and operation.  Since DWR decertified the Monterey Plus EIR, pursuant to the Court’s order, the Revised EIR also includes, without modification, the 2007 Draft EIR (Document B, including Volumes I and II) and the 2010 Final EIR (Document C, including Volumes I and II). Together, the three documents constitute the Monterey Plus Draft Revised EIR (Figure P-1). The Draft Revised EIR focuses on the development and continued use and operations of the KWB near Bakersfield. Potentially significant impacts before mitigation were related to groundwater levels and quality, Kern River water quality, the Cross Valley Canal, terrestrial biological resources, erosion, hazardous materials, waterborne disease, cultural and paleontological resources, greenhouse gas emissions, and cumulative impacts.  Potentially significant and unavoidable impacts were related to cumulative growth-related impacts. The Draft Revised EIR identifies hazardous sites on or near KWB Lands that have been remediated.

Earthquakes and High Water as Levee Hazards in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta

Delta Stewardship Council (Delta Council) | September 30th, 2016

Economic consequences of optimized water management for a prolonged, severe drought in California

American Geophysical Union (AGU) | May 21st, 2010

If abrupt climate change has occurred in the past and may be more likely under human forcing, it is relevant to look at the adaptability of current infrastructure system

If abrupt climate change has occurred in the past and may be more likely under human forcing, it is relevant to look at the adaptability of current infrastructure systems to severe conditions of the recent past. Geologic evidence suggests two extreme droughts in California during the last few thousand years, each 120–200 years long, with mean annual streamflows 40%–60% of the historical mean. This study synthesized a 72-year drought with half of mean historical inflows using random sampling of historical dry years. One synthetic hydrological record is used, and sensitivity to different interpretations of the paleo record is not evaluated. Economic effects and potential adaptation of California’s water supply system in 2020 to this drought is explored using a hydro-economic optimization model. The model considers how California could respond to such an extreme drought using water trading and provides best‐case estimates of economic costs and effects on water operations and demands. Results illustrate the ability of extensive, intertied, and flexible water systems with heterogeneous water demands to respond to severe stress. The study follows a different approach to climate change impact studies, focusing on past climate changes from the paleorecord rather than downscaled general circulation model results to provide plausible hydrologic scenarios. Adaptations suggested for the sustained drought are similar for dry forms of climate warming in California and are expensive but not catastrophic for the overall economy but would impose severe burdens on the agricultural sector and environmental water uses.

Economic Incentives— Loans, Grants, and Water Pricing (Resource Management Strategy)

California Department of Water Resources (DWR) | July 29th, 2016

Economic incentives include financial assistance, water pricing, and water market policies intended to influence water management. Economic incentives can influence the a

Economic incentives include financial assistance, water pricing, and water market policies intended to influence water management. Economic incentives can influence the amount and time of water use, wastewater volume, and source of water supply. Examples of economic incentives include low interest loans, grants, and water rates and rate structures. Free services, rebates, and the use of tax revenues to partially fund water services also have a direct effect on the prices paid by water users. Government financial assistance can provide incentives for integrated resource plans by regional and local agencies. Also, government financial assistance can help water suppliers make incentives available to their water users for a specific purpose. Assistance programs can also help align the economic and financial drivers affecting local, regional, and statewide water management decisions to minimize unintended consequences and maximize the benefits of working cooperatively with consistent goals and objectives. As opposed to incentives, penalties are a type of economic disincentive that can be used to discourage undesirable water use behavior. Incentives can be created or enhanced by facilitating water market transfers, by creating market opportunities where they did not exist, by expanding opportunities where they currently exist, or by reducing market transaction costs. In each case, new or enhanced market opportunities can influence water management decisions.

Economics of a State Water Resources Program

Legislative Analyst's Office (LAO) | July 9th, 1957